This chapter focuses on two ways in which contemporary virtue ethicists have tried to distance themselves from generalism. The two ways are strategy is to argue that the virtuousness of an action is sometimes a reason against it and strategy employed by Hursthouse, which is to defend a weaker form of particularism. Moral generalism can be defined as the view that "the very possibility of moral thought and judgment depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles" Jonathan Dancy is the leading proponent of moral particularism. He argues that there are no moral principles of the kind that generalists have in mind, but that "morality can get along perfectly well without principles". Jonathan Dancy argues, there is no good reason to believe that normative theorists will be able to discover a suitable supply of moral principles. Aristotle emphasizes the complexity of moral life, the inadequacy of rules, and the importance of judgment in moral thought and decision-making.