The Indonesian military’s political power has weakened since the fall of Soeharto. The generals no longer enjoy political hegemony and the legitimacy of dwifungsi is no longer sacrosanct nor, in terms of public opinion and some elements in the armed forces, a compelling justification for a pervasive military role in politics. The relative decline of the political position of the military has been one of the most important consequences of regime change in Indonesia. Why has the military been weakened after the fall of Soeharto? This is a key question. It is too simplistic to argue that the departure of Soeharto, the authoritarian patron, automatically led to the decline of military power in the Indonesian polity. A more important and substantial reason can be found in the discussion of the preceding chapters. It was not Soeharto’s departure, but rather his attempts to manipulate the military for his personal interests, that progressively undermined the military’s relative political power. ABRI, or TNI, remains burdened by the legacy of Soeharto’s military management during his last years. Soeharto, in his attempt to secure the military’s institutional loyalty to him, tactically encouraged divisions among top officers over several controversial issues, such as the influence of Islam, cronyism and nepotism, and coping with popular movements demanding democratization. Over these and a range of other issues two groups faced off in the twilight of the Soeharto era, one led by Prabowo, his son-in-law, and the other led by Wiranto – both of whom were Soeharto loyalists. It was this political conflict, instigated by Soeharto, that eroded the military’s institutional cohesion and encouraged the demoralization of the officer corps. The resulting lack of

cohesion significantly diminished ABRI’s ability to wield effectively its organizational power in shaping the political process. Under such circumstances civil-military relations during the transition from Soeharto to Habibie strayed outside existing patterns of military domination and became both less unequal and more adversarial. Soeharto left ABRI divided and demoralized, and thus inadvertently promoted democratization.