ABSTRACT
The popular mood after the elections of 15 June 1977 was one of justifiable optimism, although there were ominous clouds of unfinished business on the horizon. Only a minority of ordinary Spaniards, and indeed perhaps only the more cautious professional politicians, understood the scale of the problems which lay ahead. To bring both the army and the Basque extremists into the democratic fold and at the same time to confront the economic problems left by the dictatorship were tasks fraught with danger. The prevailing euphoria of mid-1977 was based on the fact that the transition had been carried through by a broad consensus of right and left and then ratified by a remarkably mature electorate. The pre-electoral confusion of over 300 political parties had been reduced on 15 June to a four-party system and the voters had opted overwhelmingly for moderation. In opinion polls, four out of every five Spaniards described themselves as belonging to the area between right and left of centre.1 After decades of being told by Franco and his minions that they were incapable of ruling themselves democratically, the majority of Spaniards were justifiably proud of the way things were turning out.
