ABSTRACT
For over three years, the West’s military, humanitarian and political approaches to the Bosnian conflict had been in misalignment. Following the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, the political will to impose a compromise peace on Bosnia increased. The impact on Western opinion, at elite, as well as mass level, of the systematic and cold-blooded round-the-clock killings resulting in the deaths of 8,000 unarmed people was undoubtedly very significant. Several of the key policy-makers in Western Europe who had staked their reputations on a minimalist policy of limited engagement also left the political stage at this time. The USA, the rhetoric of whose leaders had previously emphasised the need to avoid an unjust peace, stepped forward increasingly to shape a more engaged policy towards Bosnia. It would be one based on coercive diplomacy, combining political concessions with military force (Burg and Shoup 1999:318).
