ABSTRACT
Access to decision-makers is both a consequence and a cause of a group’s power. This may be seen as a continuum, moving from the most marginal groups that lack any form of official recognition and rely entirely on their own resources; to groups that have won such recognition and the right to sit on official (but possibly powerless) consultative committees that goes with it; to the groups of all kinds that have built up strong and institutionalised links with the legislature (whether thanks to political links, such as those of the CGT with Communist parliamentarians, or to a more all-party appeal, via the many amicales parlementaires covering a wide variety of sectors); to those groups that enjoy regular official and unofficial access to the executive. Access to the executive will always be assisted by informal networks. Chirac’s excellent relationship with the Dassault aircraft firm goes back to the days when his father had been Marcel Dassault’s banker. Polytechniciens, énarques or other graduates of grandes écoles may be attractive employees for firms (including the French branches of foreign multinationals) not just for their qualifications or their intellects but for the doors they can open. There is also every reason to suppose that in France as elsewhere, help with campaign finance can improve access to decision-makers at central or local level. It is notable that many of the building, public works and utilities firms that generously (and, for once, legally) supported candidates in the 1993 parliamentary elections hedged their bets by spreading their money between candidates of all parties. The best forms of access, finally, are multiple because they allow their beneficiaries to exploit the many divisions within the State apparatus: this is borne out, for example, in Cohen and Bauer’s analysis of relationships between the State and the major firms.
