ABSTRACT
Political problems, many of them arising out of what were superficially purely strategic ones, included the extent of the territorial rewards the Russians from the outset demanded that their allies allow them when victory was achieved. Most observers in the 1940's, and many even later, confused themselves by supposing that Communism was chiefly to do with political economy. The presumption of political prescience is largely an exercise in hindsight. Divergence was apparent even before the United States had become a belligerent. The sources of disagreement were as manifold as the problems that required attention. Initially, the purely strategic issues appeared the most divisive. The urgencies of war, however, meant that the major matters of concern during 1942 would be strategic. The Mediterranean and Italian operation had, from first to last, been his particular contribution to the grand strategy, and he could not bear to see it drain away without the fulfilment of its larger purposes.
