ABSTRACT
Whereas the various new kinds of Semantics represent a further development of the Atomist and Positivist tradition, Ordinary-Language Analytical philosophy represents a very strong reaction against that tradition. As is often the case, the reaction still shares certain ultimate assumptions with what it reacts against; but the differences are undeniably striking. For Ordinary-Language Analytical philosophers do not regard reflection and description as the primary role of language; they do not translate meaning into truth-conditions; and they do not propose an ideal form of language constructed in the service of science. Instead, they focus upon ordinary natural language and the ways in which it is ordinarily naturally used. ‘Back to the rough ground!’ as Wittgenstein says in Philosophical Investigations.56 This looks hopeful in relation to syntagmatic theory; and we have already seen how Wittgenstein’s ‘familyresemblance’ approach to single word-meanings converges with the syntagmatic approach.57 But any hopes of a more general convergence are doomed to disappointment.
