ABSTRACT
There are six main points regarding the BEF and its opponents in 1918 that emerge from this study. First, in regard to the question of command. The battles of Passchendaele and Cambrai revealed a paralysis within the BEF’s command structure, not only at the GHQ level, but also between the command levels of army, corps and division. Turning to 1918, it also appears that Haig and his GHQ did not anticipate German tactics in the first four or five months of 1918, and did not have a critical influence on the victory in the last 100 days of the war. In fact it can be argued that in the second half of 1918, Haig and the senior staff at GHQ lost power to the army commanders, and retained only a symbolic form of leadership. Second, that the hasty BEF retreat as a result of the German March offensive was not primarily because of poor defences, inferior numbers, mist, surprise, lack of labour, or any of the other arguments put forward by GHQ at the time, and subsequently, by historians. Instead the retreat was largely due to the inability of GHQ and the BEF to understand and adapt to the new defence in depth concept. Third, that the German army was really defeated by the summer of 1918. This was due partly to the cumulative effects of wearing out the German army from 1914 to 1917, and partly to the desperate efforts of the BEF in bringing the German 1918 offensives to a halt. But it can also be argued that to a considerable extent the German army defeated itself through its own offensives from March to July, because these offensives led to excessive casualties due to poor tactics, and because the OHL employed an unwise strategy that did not maintain its objectives. German morale also suffered a crippling blow in spring and summer 1918 because of heightened expectations from these ‘peace offensives’ that were not fulfilled. This defeat was hammered home by the French counter-attack of 18 July and the Amiens offensive of 8 August, followed by the constant attacks and mobile warfare of late August, September and October. Fourth, that there was a viable mechanical alternative to the more traditional forms of warfare in 1918. This alternative faded away in the BEF at the end of August 1918 in favour of manpower-oriented and semi-traditional forms of warfare. Fifth,
that the doctrine and tactics of the BEF in 1918 did not develop toward a real combination of all arms, although there was much effort in that direction. Instead, GHQ emphasized an infantry-centred army, with all other arms acting as auxiliaries to the infantry. In fact, the tactics of midto late 1918, after Amiens, were really traditional, or semi-traditional, with the artillery predominating. In reality, it was the use of large amounts of traditional and semi-traditional technology, plus attrition, that really ended the war. Sixth, and paradoxically, in terms of BEF casualties the war did not start to wind down in August 1918. Approximately as many BEF casualties were incurred in attacking the weakened and demoralized German army from August to November 1918, as there were casualties in defending against the German offensives of March to May 1918. It is also the case that 1918 was much more deadly in casualties than 1917, despite Passchendaele.
