ABSTRACT
The battle of Passchendaele revealed several fundamental planning and command errors as the campaign unfolded. Particularly obvious errors were the choice of the Passchendaele area as a battlefield; serious confusion over the objectives of the offensive, and the continuation of this confusion as the battle progressed; ambiguity over the type of offensive that was to be fought; the choice of Gough to command the offensive as GOC Fifth Army; and the continuation of the offensive in late 1917 when all hope of useful results had gone. In terms of the objectives of the Passchendaele offensive, it is worth pointing out that there were at least three aims expressed by Haig: reaching and clearing the Belgian coast; wearing down the enemy in preparation for a decisive offensive; and capturing the Passchendaele Ridge and the village of Passchendaele. (It is also worth noting that attrition-the killing of more enemy soldiers than BEF soldiers-was not one of Haig’s specific aims.) By the time that the Cambrai offensive commenced in late November, the first aim had not been achieved, the second had been achieved only partially and the third was in the process of being achieved. Cambrai itself is well known as the first major tank offensive in the history of warfare, but after an initial remarkable success, the Cambrai attack also lost focus, realistic objectives were abandoned and, like Passchendaele, the offensive was carried on too long. Command failures then led to a reluctance to prepare for a German counter-attack, and subsequently the BEF high command failed to recognize the significance of the new German tactics used in the counter-attack, which would be employed on a larger scale in the spring of 1918.
