ABSTRACT
In this state of the science, which does not permit one to separate individual conviction from universally binding truth, a reversion to questions of principle remains a task that must ever be tackled anew. This holds particularly as regards the questions which play a decisive role in the dispute among logical ‘tendencies’ and, together with this, in the dispute as to the correct demarcation of the science. The interest in just these questions has certainly cooled off in the last decades. After Mill’s brilliant attacks on the logic of Hamilton, and the no less famous, but not so fruitful, logical investigations of Trendelenburg, these questions seemed to have been fully dealt with. But with the great resurgence of psychological studies, the psychologistic tendency in logic also gained dominance, and all effort centred in the systematic building up of the discipline upon principles presumed valid. The fact, however, that so many attempts made by such important thinkers to put logic on the sure path of a science, have not led to any shattering success, suggests that the ends in view have perhaps not been sufficiently clarified to allow successful investigation.
