ABSTRACT
Expressions correlative to ‘presentation’ naturally have a correspondent ambiguity. This is particularly the case in regard to talk about ‘what is presented in a presentation’, i.e. about the ‘content’ of a presentation. That a mere distinction between content and object of presentations, like the one recommended by Twardowski following Zimmerman, will not remotely suffice – however meritorious it may have been to dig down to any formdifferences in this field – is clear from our analyses up to this point. In the logical sphere – to which these authors limit themselves without being aware of their limitation – there is not one thing which can be distinguished as ‘content’ from the object named; there are several things which can and must be so distinguished. Above all, we can mean by ‘content’, in the case, e.g., of a nominal presentation, its meaning as an ideal unity: the presentation in the sense of pure logic. To this corresponds, as a real (reelles) moment in the real (reellen) content of the presentative act, the intentional essence with its presentative quality and matter. We can further distinguish, in this real (reellen) content, the separable contents not belonging to the intentional essence: the ‘contents’ which receive their interpretation in the act-consciousness (in the intentional essence), i.e. the sensations and images. To these are again added, in the case of many presentations, variously meant differences of form and content: particularly important is here the difference of matter (in a totally new sense) and categorial form, with which we shall have to concern ourselves a great deal. With this is connected the by no means univocal talk concerning the content of concepts: content = sum total of ‘properties’, in distinction from their mode of combination. How dubious ‘blanket’ talk about ‘content’ can be, when we merely oppose act, content and object, is shown by the difficulties and confusions into which Twardowski fell, and which have in part been exposed above. We may point particularly to his talk of ‘presentative activity moving in two directions’, his complete ignoring of meaning in the ideal sense, his psychologistic elimination of plain differences of meaning by recourse to etymological distinctions and, lastly, his treatment of the doctrine of ‘intentional inexistence’ and the doctrine of universal objects.
