ABSTRACT
We come now to the matter of what Descartes has to say about how to enquire virtuously. Our principal text is a well-known passage of about a hundred and seventy words from Discourse II (CSM I: 120; AT VI: 18-19; AT VI: 550) in which Descartes puts forward four precepts that he says he thinks are adequate for the proper conduct of his enquiry (AT VI: 18: ‘je crus que j’en aurais assez des quatre’). This will seem in some ways disappointing. Not just for the usual reason that it is hard not to be dull in talking about virtue. But also because what Descartes has to say seems perfunctory, being both brief and schematic; indeed, one commentator has observed that the instructions Descartes gives are proposed more as a riddle than as guidance for the reader (Liard 1882: 12). A major and enduring complaint, made by Leibniz and taken up others,1 has been that nothing this short could constitute an illuminating guide. Against this criticism, I offer a partial defence of Descartes. The defence is only partial because the following chapters explore how the message of our passage can be applied without its being a guide, but allowing it to be illuminating. If I am to succeed in my partial defence of Descartes, what I have to make plausible is the idea that a method may be a procedure that can be rigidly applied without necessarily being fully expressible as a body of doctrine.
