ABSTRACT
Before the events of the later 1990s, if there was one issue in Australia’s external relations on which there existed unalloyed bi-partisan agreement it was East Timor. Governments of both persuasions had regarded the question of positive relations with Indonesia to be of far greater moment than the right to self-determination of the East Timorese, irrespective of the extent to which their Indonesian governors observed or denied their human rights. A Liberal-National Coalition government initiated the negotiation of the Timor Gap ‘Zone of Co-operation’ Agreement, and a Labor government signed and ratified it. But by 2000, this constant in Australia’s regional posture had changed completely. This chapter examines this major shift in Australian policy, and then considers its many consequences. Not only had Australian intervention led to the birth of a new Southeast Asian nation, to which both government and opposition had committed themselves to provide security and economic assistance for some years to come, but the East Timor experience had also compelled a thorough revision of the policy and approach of ‘regional engagement’ that had been so prominent up until that time. As the alternative security strategy was closer cooperation with Australia’s traditional treaty partner, the United States, regional order underwent significant change even prior to the events of September 11.
