ABSTRACT
It is my argument in this paper that J.S.Mill’s self-proclaimed identification with Ricardo can be accounted for without recourse to psychiatry. There is general evidence pointing to Mill’s ‘eminently sober, balanced and disciplined mind’, a view not affected by the episode of his breakdown and subsequent recovery (Hayek 1951:15, 35; cf. Wolfe 1975:33). And there is certainly nothing ‘unbalanced’ about a refusal to innovate for the sake of innovation. This is the essence of the matter. Mill insisted (and rightly so) that Ricardian method had wide applicability, extending far beyond the specific frame of reference pertinent to a capitalist-exchange system; there was therefore nothing ‘non-historical’ or ‘non-historiate’ about the method as such. Moreover, the specific axiomatic framework of Ricardian theory retained, in Mill’s estimation, its empirical relevance in contemporary circumstances. It is not difficult to demonstrate Mill’s strictly limited vision of early prospects for significant institutional change-the established frame of reference was likely to retain its empirical validity for a long time ahead; and this despite the conspicuous differentiation of the ‘temporary’ laws of distribution from the ‘permanent’ laws of production. Thus while Mill’s sentiments regarding the provisional nature of the institutional and behavioural assumptions must be taken seriously, the fact remains that a healthy degree of scepticism assured against ‘visionary enthusiasm’.
