ABSTRACT
A large body of literature on fascism and genocide in the 1940s has focused on the subject of collaboration with NS Germany in WW II Europe. Stanley Hoffmann (1968) introduced a distinction between the institutional collaboration of state authorities in wartime Europe with the occupying forces, largely motivated by pragmatic and rational considerations (collaboration d’état), and a far more profound culture of collaborationism that was triggered by ideological agreement. Although Hoffmann was referring to Vichy France, making a distinction between conservatives and fascist sympathisers (Hoffmann 1974: 3-25; Gordon 1995: 499), he did draw attention to the problems of generalising about state and population complicity in the NS wartime empire. Fascism may have operated as a form of ‘political religion’ (see earlier, Ch 3), demanding unconditional loyalty and ruthlessly stamping out dissent, but this does not mean that any form of complicity was driven solely by ideological fanaticism and full agreement. Other factors, such as rational assessments of security and status, conformity, fear of reprisals, or even opportunism and greed, were powerful incentives for collaboration, both on the institutional and on the individual level.
