ABSTRACT
Sartre reiterates his rejection of any unconscious mind and argues for his identification of the psycho-physical whole person with ‘the me’. He describes the phenomenological relations between the ego and its actions, states and qualities and analyses the concept of action. After a discussion of the relations of any object to its properties Sartre rejects the view that the ego is a thing, or like a physical object. Instead he compares the ego-states relation to the world-objects relation. Sartre describes phenomenologically the ‘poetic’ production ex nihilo by the ego of its states and argues that the ego is constituted by reflective consciousness. The ego has a pseudo-interiority which it borrows from the real interioriry of consciousness. Sartre shows himself to be anti-Cartesian on self-knowledge in refusing to privilege first person psychological ascriptions over third person ones. The ego is mistakenly taken as real but is the ideal unity of states and actions.
