ABSTRACT

At various places in this study it has been argued that the important definitions of the situation and the significant proposed solutions to the problem were crucially dependent on scientific claims. In the 1970s and early 1980s, these consisted of predictions regarding the long-term development of the ozone layer. The less ozone loss was predicted to be, the less pressure there was to do something. Moreover, the prevailing view was that one actor (or a few actors) could solve the problem alone, so long as other actors did not counter such behaviour. The USA had taken measures that led to a considerable reduction in global CFC emissions. Already in the preparatory phase of the Clean Air Act (c. 1977), which provided for a ban on the use of CFCs in aerosol sprays, the USA tried to move other countries to similar measures, but this attempt was unsuccessful. Only Norway, Sweden, Canada and Australia followed-all of them insignificant as producers and consumers of CFCs. A representative of American manufacturers did not conceal his disappointment:

Who followed? Sweden, a major user of CFCs and a non-producer. Norway, a major user, and a non-producer. Canada, a very small user and a very small producer. And Australia, a non-producer and a very small user. Europe, Russia and Asia Pacific did not follow. The rest of the world looked at the US action and said ‘The problem is solved.’ Because aerosols were indeed the largest single market and the largest single producer and user took action.