ABSTRACT
The central place of the New law for the relationship between supernature and nature has been preserved in the present age not so much by theologians as by the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. He revealed the formative social assumptions behind the is-ought distinction, which gave rise to the separation between fact and value. A connection exists between MacIntyre’s preservation of the New law and his criticism of the is-ought distinction. The New law of the Gospel is an ought, or telos, that determines and constitutes the is of creaturely being. To maintain the logic of the New law, the is-ought distinction must be understood as contingent upon a prior social formation. That an is occurs prior to, or separately from, an ought is not a necessary feature of human action. If this distinction is not challenged, then the is of modern social formations will define the real such that a moral or theological telos never disturbs nature-as-it-is. But if the is-ought distinction is shown to be something other than a necessary feature of human action, then new possibilities for understanding the sociality of human existence are opened. These new possibilities will be in conflict with modernity and capitalism. They will also allow a greater role for theology and moral philosophy in defining the is-ness of human action. Like Dempsey, MacIntyre calls upon the ancient notion of a ‘functional economy’ as an alternative to modern economics. Unlike Dempsey, MacIntyre recognizes that the is of modern economics can be finally challenged only when the ought of a theological telos re-orders that is.
