ABSTRACT
Jacques Monod's 'postulate of objectivity', which excludes cosmic purposes, also implies for him that people are strangers in the sense of inhabiting a meaningless world, which has no value in it and can give us absolutely no guidance about values. Everybody, however theoretically sceptical about morals, recognizes some such considerations, and argument designed - as Monod's certainly is - to change people's conduct could not possibly be carried on without presupposing them. This becomes luminously clear when Monod, like Sartre, wants to deliver a value-judgment of his own, immune to general scepticism. Monod's determination to avoid all such confrontation, and to hand down his value system as unquestionable, is very striking. Both the religious authorities and Monod agree on the need for a strict 'censorship' of views contrary to what is right and good.
