ABSTRACT
My aim here has been to suggest moral norms to guide actions in sport competitions. I have pursued this aim by suggesting a particular interpretation of the ideal of fair play. As a point of departure I referred to a traditional understanding of the ideal. ‘Formal’ fair play is commonly understood as a set of norms for rule conformity and justice. ‘Informal’ fair play prescribes competing with effort and devotion and with respect for other persons engaged. In order to examine in a critical and systematic way whether, and eventually how, these ideals can be justified, I developed a moral point of view that included a consequentialist norm II inspired by utilitarian reasoning, and a non-consequentialist norm III for justice. Fairness norm 1 was articulated against the background of norm III for justice and gives ‘formal’ fair play a more detailed interpretation and justification. The play norm 2 was articulated with the help of the consequentialist norm II and is designed to maximize ‘the good’ in competitions. Norm 2 can be seen as a re-articulation and justification of ‘informal’ fair play.
