ABSTRACT
All six of the principles pinpointed in Chapter 1, that many authors see to be consistent with a non-modernist, sceptical, reinvigorated practice of History, have a bearing upon the question of how we represent an historical subject’s identity. However, in this chapter I will concentrate on the fifth point: ‘a rejection of humanistic views of the centred/essentialized and static or fixed Self ’. This is the notion of a core self derived in part from the Christian soul, but more the product of modern Western individualism. In postmodernism, on the other hand, the Self (or individual subjectivity) is seen to be discursively constituted in an ongoing process. In various contexts in earlier chapters I have addressed critiques of
sion, individual identity – in relation to culture/nationality, race/ ethnicity, sex/gender, or sexuality. But, here the focus will be more on the individual, particularly the political subjectivity of the individual, and also more concerned than earlier with sex/gender and sexuality. As in former chapters, I will be drawing substantially upon feminist theory, which over the years has increasingly featured a central concern with subjectivity and thus has much to contribute to the discussion. However, like in my introduction I will begin by referring particularly to Roland Barthes. In connection with history/historiography, it may be Barthes’ notion of history’s ‘reality effect’ that is most often discussed, yet another area in which he has been influential and which is no less important is human subjectivity. The above quote from his so-called ‘autobiography’, ‘R.B.’ or Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, illustrates why, with its reference to the ‘divided’ or ‘dispersed’ (otherwise, often termed the ‘fragmented’) subject or Self. It should be noted that this concept of the acentric or fragmented Self (or multiple selves), is related to a polemic most often associated particularly with Barthes or Foucault, concerning the ‘death of the author’ or subject.
