Through all the discussions of the nature of money there runs the question as to whether money, in order to carry out its services of measurement, exchange and representation of values, is or ought to be a value itself; or whether it is enough if money is simply a token and symbol without intrinsic value, like an accounting sum which stands for a value without being one. The whole technical and historical discussion of this question, which involves the most profound issues in the theory of money and value, would be superfluous if it could be decided by a frequently quoted logical argument. A measuring instrument, it is said, has to have the same quality as the object to be measured: a measure of length has to be long, a measure of weight has to be heavy, a measure of space has to have dimensions; consequently, a measure of value has to be valuable. No matter how unrelated two things may be in all other respects, when I measure them against each other they must both have the quality that I am comparing. Any quantitative and numerical equality or inequality that I assert would be meaningless if it did not refer to relative quantities of one and the same quality. Indeed, this identity of qualities must not be of too general a nature; for instance, it is impossible to compare the beauty of a piece of architecture with the beauty of a person, even though both have the quality of beauty. Only the particular architectural or the particular human qualities of beauty make a comparison possible. But even if a common quality is lacking, one might still consider the reaction of the contemplating subject as a basis for comparability. If the beauty of a building and the beauty of a person are comparable in the amount of enjoyment that the contemplation of either one of them affords us, then an identity of qualities might be asserted in spite of the apparent variation. The equal

effect upon the same subject reflects the equality of the objects with reference to the relation in question. Two completely different phenomena that give the same pleasure to the same subject have, over and above all their differences, an equal force or an equal relation to the subject; just as when a gust of wind and a human hand break a branch of a tree demonstrate, in spite of the incomparability of their qualities, an equal amount of energy. Thus the substance of money, and everything that is measured by it, may be completely different, but they would have to coincide in the one point that they both have value; and even if value is nothing but a subjective response to the impressions received from things, at least the quality by which they affect the sense of value in men has to be the same in both-even though it cannot be isolated. Thus, it is claimed that money has to have the quality of value because it is compared with values and enters into a quantitative equation with values.