ABSTRACT
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency, once the outcome of a particular event is known, to over-estimate how predictable that outcome was in foresight. Hindsight bias has been demonstrated in a variety of applied and experimental settings (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, and ChristensenSzalanski & Willham, 1991, for reviews). Fischhoff (1975), in his seminal work in this area, suggested that hindsight bias makes it difficult to learn the lessons of the past. Many authors have since echoed this argument (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff, 1982). For example, Arkes and his colleagues (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, & Harkness, 1981) note that if, after learning about a confirmed diagnosis a physician believes that he
or she “knew-it-all-along”, the outcome information may not provide the learning that might otherwise take place. In contrast to this original focus on its negative impact on decision making, in recent years hindsight bias has been framed as a natural byproduct of generally functional processes. “Adjusting conclusions in light of outcome information is the sine qua non of learning, but carries the attendant effect of an exaggerated certainty regarding that outcome. As such, the hindsight bias is best viewed on the same conceptual field as other functionally sound cognitive simplifications, such as attitudes, stereotypes, and impressions: Quick and often pragmatically useful inferences that are sometimes made at the expense of accuracy” (Roese & Olson, 1996, p. 224; also see Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 579). This re-framing of the hindsight bias has three important implications that underlie the present research. First, hindsight bias should not be seen as a singular, distinct phenomenon, but should be considered in the context of related psychological processes. Second, expanding on Roese and Olson’s analysis, receipt of outcome information sometimes leads to the development rather than to the adjustment of conclusions. Outcomes often arise about which people have not made prior judgements of likelihood (unless prompted to by a researcher’s question, as in a hindsight bias study). Few people, for instance, probably estimated in foresight the likelihood that the estranged wives of O.J.Simpson and Robert Blake would be murdered. Of course, although many events such as these occur about which people have not made prior likelihood judgements, certain other events, such as highly publicised trials, sporting events, and elections, may readily stimulate judgements in foresight about the likelihood of the alternative outcomes. However, even when people are faced with processes that could easily elicit prospective judgements of likelihood, they are sometimes, by virtue of their roles,
Requests for reprints should be sent to Melvin M. Mark, Department of Psychology, 417 Moore, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA. Email: M5M@PSU.EDUThanks are due to three anonymous reviewers and the Special Issue editors for helpful feedback on previous drafts.
