ABSTRACT
War’s end did not immediately bring about any great innovations in British and American intelligence. Britain’s intelligence system remained largely decentralized, and William Donovan’s attempt to perpetuate his organization as a strongly centralized American post-war intelligence service came to nought. Ironically, OSS faded from the scene just as Russia began emerging as a real threat to the post-war world. American intelligence bodies largely failed to anticipate this development in keeping with the assumptions of America’s preferred post-war foreign policy, while OSS was itself primarily geared toward ‘denazifying’ occupied Germany. Thanks to information obtained from British intelligence, however, the London mission finally began appreciating matters just before OSS was disbanded. A successor organization was then left to manage an evolving intelligence situation that its political superiors only dimly recognized, and that it was hardly equipped to deal with alone. The ongoing relationship with British intelligence thus acquired great significance throughout early 1946. British policy-makers were only too aware of Russian hostility toward traditional British interests, and of Britain’s inability to confront this threat alone. They naturally considered it imperative to inform American leaders about this situation, and the Anglo-American intelligence relationship proved critical to achieving this end. This link not only contributed in due course to America’s reassessment of Soviet intentions, but it also indirectly helped prove the continued relevance of a fully mobilized American peacetime intelligence capability, thereby succeeding where Donovan himself failed. The Anglo-American intelligence connection in the face of a mutual threat thus recalls the context of OSS/London’s genesis. It also illustrates the consistent importance of Britain’s pragmatic self-interest, and down-plays the significance usually ascribed to Donovan personally. The Anglo-American intelligence relationship accordingly entered the Cold War as it did the Second World War-grounded in necessity, not in sentiment or superficial personality. By mid-1946, the
intelligence dimension of Anglo-American affairs had indeed turned full circle.
