On 6 June 1944 the first Anglo-Canadian armoured units forced their way ashore on the Normandy beaches and began a long, arduous and at times frustrating campaign against the Heer and Waffen SS, though one that ultimately resulted in a tremendous victory. Yet despite this success and that of subsequent operations, the Allied tank forces are widely considered to have failed substantially in their efforts throughout most of the campaign, and have been variously described as doctrinally naïve, inflexible, poorly prepared and ill-equipped. Indeed, it is considered by some that Allied armour signally failed to come to terms with the operating environment of Normandy. In contrast, German armoured units and commanders are viewed as a flexible, intuitive, and highly effective force more than capable of outperforming their Allied counterparts, even in the face of great adversity. Critics of British armour point to the disasters at Villers Bocage (13 June) and Operation Goodwood (18 July), the offensive frailties displayed in and around Hill 112 and Caen in June and July, and during the drive towards Mont Pinçon in August. Even when German resistance was crumbling in August, Anglo-Canadian armour struggled to make progress during Operations Totalise and Tractable. It has even been suggested that British armour did little to bring about the Allied victory throughout the campaign.1