ABSTRACT
Britain’s overriding imperative in its relations with Egypt was to manipulate its leadership, through a mixture of persuasion, cajolery and bullying, to serve the interests of the military base. Though the treaty formalised the nature of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship, it did not make it any easier for British diplomats and senior military personnel to achieve their ends. By the same token, while Egypt was now free to pursue an independent foreign policy, in practice the old constraints continued. Once the euphoria of finally achieving a legitimising treaty died down, a feeling of mutual mistrust remained, compounded by the Egyptians’ growing conviction that Britain could not adequately protect them from the perceived might of the Axis. The immediate pre-war years represented an especially difficult time with the Wafd, the party most associated with the treaty, replaced by unstable and undemocratic Palace-backed regimes reluctant to deliver on British desiderata. Ultimately, once war came, the Ali Maher regime needed to be removed. Even this did not prevent Egypt from remaining a neutral, albeit a benevolent one, a stance that Britain’s omnipresent and increasing military presence ensured.
