ABSTRACT
Between 1955 and 1959 the British pursued an ambitious programme in southwest Arabia designed to consolidate their long-term influence in the region. This forward policy emerged piecemeal rather than as part of a grand design. It was an outcome of the accordance between the natural inclination of the men on the spot to pursue a policy of imperial pacification and the instincts of Whitehall policy-makers which were to maintain a significant role in Middle East politics. Aden was a useful military base and became the headquarters of British Forces in the Middle East in 1960. Its hinterland provided a cordon sanitaire but the base itself could have been safeguarded with a less activist policy had there not been an overwhelming concern with the expansionist ambitions of the Yemeni Imams and the regional aspirations of Nasser. The latter in particular struck at widely held conceptions of Britain’s role as a significant world power. It is worth first considering the clash between the British desire to play an influential role in Middle East politics and Nasser’s commitment to Arab nationalism in order to put the conflicts in southwest Arabia in context. Subsequently the manner in which the low intensity warfare in the Aden Protectorates became a part of the Anglo-Egyptian struggle is examined. Events in the EAP, Lahj, Upper ‘Awlaqi and Dali‘ are interpreted as instances of this trend. Britain’s long-term plans for southwest Arabia will then be considered as will the opposition to them that emerged from Yemen and the colony of Aden. The ascent of nationalist feeling in Yemen and Aden Colony during the late 1950s illustrates the pervasiveness of Nasser’s influence at this time.
