ABSTRACT
During the disasters of the battle of France in May and June 1940 SOE did not even exist. It was only set up in mid-July, and was still puling in its cradle in August and September, while the Germans were fighting the battle of Britain and providing sabotage targets of high priority in the ports and aerodromes where they were getting ready their invasion, which they had to cancel because they could not command the sky. Their preparations in France were disturbed only by such aircraft as bomber and coastal commands could muster, and by a few uncoordinated acts of despairing heroism by Frenchmen who could not bring themselves to accept the fact of defeat. As early as 7 August 1940 German main headquarters in Paris was receiving complaints of French sabotage activities, and a circular on repressive measures against them, including curfew and the seizure of hostages, was issued by it on 12 September.1 We have seen already the attempts made by MIR at active operations into France during the collapse: the achievement, one spendid fire, was minimal, considering the size and variety of targets that would have been available had any organization been ready to attack them, MIR’s own appreciation of what was going on, completed on 4 July – the day after the naval disaster at Mers-el-Kebir – still laid down that the first object of British defensive strategy must be to capture or destroy the French fleet;2 but no one in MIR could do anything towards achieving this, and in any case that branch was soon broken up. Most of its remaining staff were absorbed into SO 2, and the department ceased to exist in October.
