ABSTRACT

By the start of the 1990s, a great deal of attention had been focused on the state of British naval policy and its impact on the viability of existing strategies. Much of the debate stemmed from the ‘wearing off’ of the post-Falklands euphoria and a recognition that structural problems in the force composition of the Royal Navy had not been fundamentally addressed after 1982, merely papered over. Consequently the service as a whole was beginning to exhibit signs of overstretch and fatigue from the increasing multitude of tasks placed on them by the government. Adding to these existing concerns, the unexpected end of the Cold War now presented defence planners with a new set of strategic circumstances. For the first time in four decades, policy makers were offered an uncluttered strategic vista without the traditional reference points (the Soviet Union and the continental commitment) which were appearing to fade literally before their eyes, and somehow they had to construct a defence posture that would be appropriate to this new environment. Furthermore, at the height of the defencepolicy reassessment process, a new element would impose itself on British strategic thinking: the Gulf War of 1991.