ABSTRACT
After publication of his Somme volume in 1932 Edmonds proceeded to complete his volume on the German offensive of March 1918. It will be remembered that Edmonds, and the War Office, had been anxious to complete this volume out of sequence and ahead of other volumes. A series of problems with previous writers employed for this task had delayed completion considerably beyond the desired timescale. The writing of this volume is of considerable importance to an understanding of the process and historical value of Edmonds’ work. As with his Somme volume, the impact of the evidence of hundreds of participants in shaping the content and conclusions of this work will be considered alongside the level of influence exercised by Edmonds’ more senior colleagues. Of significance is the degree to which Edmonds exposed failings where they occurred and thereby highlighted the undoubtedly important lessons of this experience for future generations of military students. A number of his critics have suggested that in four major areas Edmonds allowed lessons to be ignored.
