ABSTRACT
The fall of Singapore and the imminent loss of Burma suddenly transformed India Command from a sleepy backwater into a front line base of operations. Indeed, the defence of Ceylon, the NE frontier of India and its lengthy coastline from amphibious landings was thrown into doubt following the fall of Rangoon. The preparedness of the Army in India, now the only appreciable uncommitted reserve of British manpower east of Suez, left much to be desired. Little of the highly professional pre-war regular Indian Army remained. As fast as new formations had been organised, equipped and trained – 7 divisions – they had been sent to the Middle East and Malaya. Attempts to shore up the defence of Malaya and Burma meant that even partially trained and incomplete formations remaining had been sent overseas; whose limited battlefield effectiveness caused profound shock. As the Director of Staff Duties at GHQ India, candidly admitted in mid-January 1942: ‘The fighting value of Indian troops... has fallen very, very far below the standard of Sidi Barani and Keren. Events in Malaya, when they become to be known, will make very sad reading and the Indian Army will not feel very proud of itself when facts become known.’ 1 By March 1942 the cupboard was nearly bare in terms of trained manpower. Only one trained British and six Indian formations still in the process of being formed remained at GHQ India’s immediate disposal, in addition to 150.000 men tied down on the North-West frontier and on Internal Security duties.
