ABSTRACT
The Arakan debacle added to the already long catalogue of disasters British arms had suffered since the outbreak of war with Japan. 1 It is difficult to disagree with Raymond Callahan that it was perhaps the ‘worst managed British military effort of the war’ and ‘as bad as anything that had happened in Malaya and Burma’. 2 Despite enjoying overwhelming numerical superiority at the beginning of the campaign, superior artillery and a monopoly in tanks, the first British offensive to free Burma had ended in dismal failure. 3 While losses had been relatively light morale plummeted in India Command, as stories grew in the telling about the invincibility of the IJA and the terrors of the jungle. Many serious weaknesses clearly still existed in the organisation, equipment and above all tactical training of British and Indian units. British tactical methods had also been inappropriate, combined arms tactics non-existent and inter-service co-operation negligible. Too often attacks had been on ‘strict Staff College lines’ and mounted on narrow fronts rather than exploiting the jungle that to most troops remained a forbidding environment. 4 An attempt was quickly made to see some redeeming features, from this debacle, however, upon which further changes in the Army in India could be based. As Field Marshal Wavell later observed in his despatch: ‘The greatest gain from the campaign was experience, of the enemy’s methods and of our own defects in training and organisation. The serious loss was in prestige and morale.’ 5
