ABSTRACT
In August 1941, Cunningham told Admiral Kelly, ‘I hate this being cooped up in the Eastern Mediterranean and very nearly go into a frenzy when I hear of Italian surface ships being at sea in the Central Mediterranean.’1 The battle fleet was frequently immobilised for lack of a screen. Only limited use could be made of shore-based torpedo squadrons, while reconnaissance and fighter support was patchy. Since the enemy had recovered Cyrenaica and now held the Balkans and Crete, while threatening to add Russia, Cyprus and the Middle East, the British were hemmed into Egypt and Palestine. Cunningham had realised the strategic consequences that the loss of Crete and half his fleet would impose and told Pound that he found his new position ‘eminently unsatisfactory since it is almost entirely defensive’.2 British bases were also less secure. The trans-Mediterranean route was Virtually closed’ as Axis planes could attack convoys almost everywhere, thus threatening Malta. The imminent risk to Alexandria might well lead the fleet to abandon it and the Suez Canal. The possession of a ring of air bases enabled the enemy to safeguard their own Libyan traffic. All the cards seemed stacked in Axis hands, causing Cunningham to warn, ‘We are on the edge of disaster here.’3
