ABSTRACT
Operation ‘Torch’ was launched on 8 November 1942 to seize Casablanca, Algiers and Oran, ultimately gaining the southern shore of the Mediterranean in conjunction with the Eighth Army’s offensive from E1 Alamein. An Anglo-American expedition, it was the product of months of wrangling over the strategy for 1942. The American tradition of war-making was uncomplicated and direct; go immediately for the main enemy’s jugular and end the war expeditiously and with the minimum of casualties. That meant an early landing in north-west France and a drive to the heart of Nazi Germany. Moreover, Germany was the only enemy that could defeat both Russia and Britain, so the Americans regarded it as a ‘second front’ to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union, facing imminent collapse unless aided by supplies and military assistance. The British agreed that Germany was the principal enemy and were equally anxious to open a ‘second front’ in 1942. However, while endorsing the rapid build-up of American forces in Britain (‘Bolero’), they were sceptical about the likely success of the two American proposals: ‘Sledgehammer’, an emergency lodgement on the west coast of France if the Russians looked like folding; and ‘Roundup’, a more substantial invasion on the Channel coast that aimed to cut Hitler’s throat in 1943. They feared either complete repulse of the invasions or a stalemate on 1914-18 lines. Germany was too strong to defeat by direct methods; she must be worn down by the traditional British peripheral approach, which utilised the mobility and superiority of allied sea power to stretch enemy forces. They preferred an invasion of Vichy North Africa, claiming numerous benefits would flow from it. Cunningham had little to do with the original strategic arguments but when given an opportunity expounded succinctly the case for ‘Torch’:
I am more than ever convinced that events this year lie in the Mediterranean…. It would go a long way towards solving our shipping problem once the short route through the Mediterranean was gained. It would jeopardise the whole of Rommel’s forces and relieve anxiety about Malta. It would shake Italy to the core and rouse the occupied countries. To intervene effectively Hitler would have to act through Spain and/or unoccupied France thus involving him in most unwelcome fighting and transport commitments. The troops for the purpose would have to be
Russian situation might well be conclusive.
