ABSTRACT
The invasion of Italy, a speculative, opportunistic adventure, with little thought for the long-term military consequences, took the form it did because of deep Anglo-American strategic differences.1 In May 1943, the CCS agreed on the early ‘elimination of Italy as a belligerent’, the acquisition of air bases in the north, the liberation of Sardinia and Corsica, the maintenance of pressure on the Germans, and indirect support of landings in north and south France.2 The invasion of Italy, Churchill and Brooke argued (again), would cement the Allies’ grip on the Mediterranean, save more shipping, bring about the surrender of the Italians, allow the transfer of the Mediterranean Fleet to the east, present the Allies with airfields from which to bomb targets from the south, support partisans in the Balkans, and draw German strength both from the cross-Channel landings and from the eastern front. Churchill hoped also to maintain the Mediterranean as a largely British sphere militarily and politically and aimed to restore the Italian monarchy and a conservative government. The Allies, anxious to prove to Stalin that they were carrying on fighting until the cross-Channel attack could be launched, thought the surrender of Italy would foster a prompt conquest of the peninsula.3 Roosevelt and Marshall appreciated the advantages of a rapid exploitation of the confused Italian situation but insisted that forces must be transferred to the invasion of northern France, while King was anxious to reinforce the east. Furthermore, the Americans, who had a sizeable and well-organised Italian population, wanted a truly democratic republic to be set up. They thought Italy, ideally suited to defence, was also a bad place in which to fight and, though acknowledging the inadequacy of the forces, were most reluctant to assign more to it. It was a transitional stage between British domination of
Americans were persuaded to fight there was probably due to Dill’s close friendship with Marshall.4
