ABSTRACT
Terrorism in not new. Nor is it an entity. Rarely is it an ideology. It is simply a method of conflict frequently defined as a deliberate attack on the innocent (outside the context of organizedwar) with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation. In the nineteenth century, Joseph Conrad drew an indelible portrait of the terrorist mind, and terrorism was a familiar phenomenon in the twentieth century. Whether homegrownor transnational, itwas a staple of conflicts throughout theMiddleEast, in Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, South Africa, and elsewhere. It occurred on every continent except Antarctica and affected nearly every Trilateral country. September 11, 2001was a dramatic escalation of an age-old phenomenon. But September 11 also began a divergence of perspectives about terrorism
among the Trilateral countries. After an initial surge of solidarity illustrated by a headline in Le Monde declaring, “we are all Americans now,” the differences between United States and the other countries began to widen. The United States declared a war on transnational terrorism, greatly increased its defense budget, fought a war in Afghanistan, declared a new strategy that expanded pre-emption into the realm of preventive war, and undertook the most massive reorganization of its government in more than half a century. Other countries, while cooperating with the United States on Afghanistan, intelligence sharing, and police work, began to express concern that the United States was over-reacting. In a description by the French analyst Therese Delpech, “most Europeans do not accept the idea of a ‘war’ on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice) . . . . The Europeans fear that the Americans are engaging in an endless war without considering all the possible consequences.”1 Similar attitudes could be encountered in many parts of Asia. It is not surprising that attitudes diverged. After all, the tragedy of September 11
happened inside the United States and created a greater and longer lasting sense of urgency. Many governments were anxious not to frighten their populations or exacerbate relations with their Muslim minorities. Some people believed that American foreign policy was in part responsible for the disaster and that it would be wise to seek distance from the United States. But perhaps, most importantly, was the widespread feeling of déja vu. Europe, Japan, and other countries had
lived through severe episodes of terrorism in the 1970s and 80s, yet managed to overcome it with their democracies intact. Terrorism was a nuisance that had to be managed, not a challenge requiring total change. Moreover, the political rhetoric of “evil” and “war” that helped to mobilize the American public seemed alien and alarming to many overseas who preferred a managerial approach. Different perceptions are natural among the different political cultures of the
Trilateral countries, but when these perceptions go unchecked they can have dangerous effects. European andAsian reactions could reduce incentives for cooperation. American irritation with its allies could reinforce unilateralist responses to problems that would benefit from more cooperative approaches. Over time, such friction could spill over into other areas as well. But most important, diverging perceptions could limit the cooperation that is necessary to address common vulnerabilities and leave everyone worse off.
