The British Government was embarking on yet another negotiating effort with reluctance. A peaceful settlement was preferred to a violent one but not on any terms. Both the Haig mediation and the Peruvian initiative had ended up as negotiations between London and Washington with precious little Latin American input. The Government had been subjected to constant calls for compromise and restraint with no evidence of any Argentine interest in either. Having cast itself as the victim in the affair, the Government had surprised itself by how conciliatory it had been prepared to be to the sensitivities of the aggressor. Still Buenos Aires wanted more and it appeared that it would only be satisfied when Britain agreed that sovereignty over the Falklands was to be transferred. As this could not be agreed another round of negotiations appeared pointless. At the same time military action carried high political costs, and the Government had been chastened by the exclamations of international anguish provoked by the Belgrano. The loss of Sheffield had been chastening in a different way. This highlighted the military risks now being faced, and the War Cabinet understood that the Chiefs were by no means sure about achieving a successful landing let alone the repossession of the Islands.