ABSTRACT
The term judgment is frequently used as a general expression for any kind of cognitive act. But two characteristics commonly attributed to the judgment appear incompatible with so wide a use. The judgment is generally taken to be an act of thought which employs ideas, 1 and which is directly expressed in the proposition. 2 I have tried to show in the preceding chapter that there are cognitive acts which do not employ ideas, and which are not directly expressed in propositions. Thus the apprehension of the present fact is (on my view) a form of knowledge, but quite distinct from the judgment which describes it, and needing some further intellectual act to render it expressible in the proposition. I have therefore thought it best to use the colourless term assertion for the general expression required, restricting the term judgment to the species of assertions which employ ideas, and are directly expressible in a sentence. Taking the judgment in that sense we have now to consider its general characteristics, i.e. its contents and conditions. We shall raise the questions thus defined for certain great classes of judgment separately, and then put our results together.
