ABSTRACT
My study of the puzzle of India’s governance engages the debate at a time when governance research as a whole has reached an analytical cul-de-sac. From its earlier emphasis on process, governance, particularly in the wake of 9/11, has moved on to the more loaded concept of good governance with a focus on electoral democracy, promoted by armed liberal governments. A theoretical concept of great analytical power has thus been transformed into a political slogan.1 Its popularity with policy makers is in the same league as that of the ‘third way’ of New Labour in the United Kingdom during recent years. It appears to be refreshingly free from the orthodoxy of class, race and caste; it gives an impression that important issues are being attended to, but does not, in practice, spell out the criteria of the measurement of progress. One can, in fact, already detect the signs of emasculation of this powerful concept by the conservative dynamism of the system. Rather than opting for a normative approach with a predesignated definition of good governance or an emphasis on process (Kohli 1990; March and Olsen 1995) with no clear cut-off points that demark low from high governance,2 I have argued in this book in favour of an approach that locates itself at the interface of the state and society, one that can be empirically measured in terms of facts, opinions and discourse, and is relevant to the making of decisions that affect governance.
