ABSTRACT
In order to understand Germany’s war, one must understand two concepts that were central to German social assumptions and, therefore, to German military policy as well. The first, the “stab in the back,” or Dolchstoß, we have already examined. Originally designed to deflect the blame of German military defeat in World War I onto Jews, communists, and other perceived domestic enemies of the Second Reich, it developed a life of its own and became a seminal construct of Third Reich thinking. When combined with German notions of their own racial and military superiority, the Dolchstoß had important military ramifications. It implied that German defeat could not come on the battlefield. If Germany were to be defeated again, it would be at the hands of domestic enemies, as the believers in the Dolchstoß understood the defeat of 1918. German military officers and special police therefore became obsessed with rooting out enemies and suspected enemies. This manic fixation led the Nazi regime to criminalize and demonize many sections of German society and to commit all manner of crimes. It also significantly detracted from Germany’s ability to prosecute the war effectively.
