Introduction

Nothing illustrates the pervasiveness of a de-historicized economic rationality more than the debate over the causes of, and solutions to, the precipitous drop in East and Southeast Asian currency values in 1997 and the ensuing meltdown of some of the fastest growing economies in history. Led by Japan, economies along Asia's Pacific coasts had posted such spectacular growth rates that even the World Bank had been compelled to acknowledge the significance of macroeconomic planning and the centrality of industrial policy in the economic success of the ‘East Asian model of growth’ (World Bank, 1993: 5–6, 8–10, 83–4). ¹ Just as the rapid growth of economies on Asia's Pacific perimeters had led to hagiographic evaluations of their performance, their headlong descent in 1997–98 prompted an equally sharp turnabout in assessments of their patterns of growth. Their overnight transformation from nimble tigers to debt-laden, lumbering elephants was attributed to ‘crony capitalism’: code for cozy arrangements between governments and entrepreneurs that led to ready infusions of cash to those with the right political connections while insulating them from shareholder scrutiny, the need to disclose embarrassing financial information, or exposure to serious foreign competition in their domestic markets.