Both these forms of interpretation are ultimately unsatisfactory. At best they explain partially; at worst they attribute universal characteristics to society and individuals (for example, in the form of instinctive behaviour) that are hard to justify for historically and geographically distant peoples. It was argued above that representations must be set in their specific context; neither voluntarist nor determinist perspectives do this adequately. Many cultural researchers have emphasised the importance of studying the relationship between human action, our capacity to act as free independent individuals, and social structure – the rules and relationships that tie us to groups and organisations through, for example, education, work, leisure and family. Though we cannot present these debates fully here (see Giddens, 1984; Cohen, 1989; Parker, 2000), it is important to have some idea of the extent to which our capacity to make and interpret representations is a result of either ourselves as free-thinking creative individuals or comes from larger social and biological forces about which we have little understanding or control. Although positions have altered frequently in recent decades, much contemporary theory concerned with the production and interpretation of cultural materials has advocated an approach in which individual human agency and wider social forces, rules and structures both play a role.