ABSTRACT
One of the outstanding characteristics of logical positivism is the disqualification of “metaphysics” as meaningless language. We cannot say that the positivists take it for granted that religious language as such is included in this censure. 1 Still, it is an important task for a philosophy of religion on an analytical basis to set forth to what extent this attack upon metaphysics is “meaningful,” and what sense needs to be ascribed to the word “metaphysics.” For up to this very day there has been, in the fields of philosophy and theology taken together, a sharp distinction between those who defend metaphysics (theologians and most philosophers, whether idealists or not) and those who condemn it (skeptics, Hume, positivists, and empiricists). How can philosophy of religion be “analytic” if that term implies an alignment with antimetaphysicians? Indeed, the present book defends a renversement des alliances; it sides on several issues with the positivists and rates the conception of “metaphysics” as inappropriate language, a gain for philosophy of religion.
