ABSTRACT

This chapter and the subsequent one are concerned with barriers that impede the process of integration and which have their origin in the activities of the state. Quite clearly such inhibiting factors include tariffs, quotas, and so on, but account must be taken of a variety of non-tariff barriers which also owe their existence to state involvement in the economy – see Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 will be concerned with other non-tariff barriers which for the most part will be private in origin. In the previous chapter we noted that in varying degrees it was envisaged that economic integration under the Paris and Rome Treaties was to be accomplished through the agency of competitive trade. The growth of interpenetration and interdependence required that the internal barriers should be removed. However since we are concerned with the competition policies of the two Communities it is necessary that we also address ourselves to the question of the degree of external protection. The latter is quite crucial since the degree of competition within the integrated area depends not merely on the ease with which industries and firms in each member state can sell in the markets of other member states but is also governed by the extent to which the integrated market can be penetrated from without. Indeed there are some industries, such as clothing and textiles, where it is quite clear that the main competitive threat is external rather than internal. It would also be quite legitimate to extend our analysis of competition policy to include a discussion of the rules which govern rivalry between Community firms in third country markets. In practice this is not a major concern of either the Paris or the Rome Treaty although some Community policy decisions do relate directly to it and others are indirectly relevant. 1