ABSTRACT
This chapter grapples with Russia's politico-legal duality, employing the Dual State model as introduced by Ernst Fraenkel (1941), and examines the role of selective law enforcement within this system of governance. Compared to earlier adaptations of Fraenkel to Russian realities, this chapter engages in a more direct dialogue with the original model and delves into its theoretical insights at greater length. Not only does the formal system grant a degree of legitimacy and efficiency to the hybrid regime, its semi-autonomous character also ensures the exclusiveness of the insider group by increasing the barriers for less potent adversaries to instrumentalize the state. The centralization of extralegal influence within Putin's hierarchy, moreover, makes sure the laws bend when the political leaders require them to be malleable. Another aspect of the duality concerns how the Russian population over time has been primed to interpret ordinary and exceptional cases as belonging to separate realms. As this book will illustrate, this has important ramifications for Russian governance.
