ABSTRACT
EVERYBOD Y and everything, in 1933, had to be ‘integrated’ or ‘co-ordinated.’ Gleichschaltung became the universal order of the day and, for a time, the most important word in the German political dictionary. Those who sought or accepted place or position in the new Germany or, more precisely, joined the Party, the S.A., the S.S., the Hitler Youth, or another group of the same allegiance, did so from various motives. Many members of the youth movement did so with considerable enthusiasm; they had been in general sympathy with National Socialism for some time, and for them, joining the movement was simply the logical thing to do. Others, whose approval had been more reserved, were either swept into the movement by the huge tidal wave of nationalist emotion, or thought it necessary to join because everybody else did, or be cause abstention might have damaged their professional prospects. Of these opportunist or reluctant converts the motives again varied, as did their subsequent behaviour. Some became opponents of the regime at an early date; some discovered the value of democratic principles after 1945; and there are some who are still of the opinion that National Socialism (barring some regrettable errors) was the best political regime Germany ever had. Many argue now that National Socialism was a perversion of the youth movement; in 1933 it was the great wave of the future. I
I The history of the Bunde comes to an end in June 1933. Some of the members joined the S.A., others the S.S.; and a few became aides-de-camp to Hess and other dignitaries. Like immigrants in a new and unknown continent, they tended to flock together in cer tain parts or places of the new order: Volkstum undHeimat, one of
the many Party subsidiaries, the Kulturgemeinde, and Professor Hauer’s ‘German Faith’ movement were institutions with a high percentage of bundische members.1 For the behaviour of individuals and groups in this crisis various explanations have subsequently been advanced; it has been said that they had to compromise with National Socialism in order to save some, at least, of the creations of the youth movement, such as the Frankfurt Musikheim and the Silesian Boberhaus. If Paris was well worth a mass, was not a public avowal of confidence in the new rulers, or an open letter to Dr. Goebbels, a cheap price to pay for these cherished creations ? There were indeed such considerations, but they do not wholly account for what happened. Only people who were in general sympathy with the new authorities could have been willing to make such gestures or declarations; no one else could have been so optimistic as to believe that Hitler would put up with any manifestations of the spirit of the youth movement in his totalitarian State.
