ABSTRACT
What had really happened was not so alarming as report suggested. Cæsar had not the intention so naïvely attributed to him in many quarters of remaining quietly on the defensive in the valley of the Po; but neither was he inclined to march straight upon the capital. By the 4th of January he had probably heard of the reception given by the Senate to his last proposals and he had now to make up his mind how to face the situation. What course should he pursue? To wait quietly in his province, plying the Senate with futile recriminations till his command expired on the 1st of July was hardly practicable; it would have given his enemies just what they needed—time to collect their forces, and opportunities of sowing discord amongst his soldiers; for he had already for some time past been aware that Labienus was untrustworthy. Somehow or other he must find means to stiffen his verbal protests; the Senate needed the vigorous tonic of an open defiance. But defiance was difficult, for it involved the risk of provoking a civil war. Moreover, it was impossible to predict what impression it might produce upon his own soldiers. It was the attitude of the legionaries in the approaching crisis which really formed the pivot of the situation and swayed the calculations of the two opposing parties. They had already been through a lengthy series of exhausting campaigns. Could he ask them now to follow him through the odium and vicissitudes of a civil war f
