ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that true parallelism collapses when applied to pure feelings and sensations, because the contents thereof are richer in manifoldness than the physical which could in any sense be 'parallel' with them. The perceptual elements differ among themselves in a truly 'qualitative' manner, even within one and the same sense. The mind, or rather the psychoid, is assumed to be itself a manifold, although not in a spatial nor most certainly in a perceptual sense. For the mind as a given thing brings with it its own manifoldness: 'latent' component parts of this manifoldness are awakened—and these parts are so arranged that when awakened by a quantitative difference they themselves give a different qualitative reaction. The analysis of the psychophysics of perception not only is destructive of a parallelism, but also supports the theory of mind as a given manifold—and that without dragging the 'higher functions' of the mind into the discussion.
