ABSTRACT
The memory-images have two peculiarities, which make them very strange 'mental things', and, which cause, at the least, great difficulties for the parallelistic theory. The falsification of the memory-image is in part only the result of a deficiency of characteristics, that is, of a lack of many details of the original experience; in part, it is a real falsification. The peculiarities of the memory-image which have just been described, can at once be seen to offer great difficulties to the parallelistic theory. Recognition may be considered from two sides for the purpose of the parallelistic problem: from the side of its origin from the physical, and from the side of its own intrinsic character. The discussion of the recognition of pure relations leads directly to the consideration of the mental fact of 'abstraction'; in more precise language, it leads to the consideration of the fact that the author may consciously have or experience universal ideas.
