ABSTRACT
I I f the primitives’ collective representations differ from ours through their essentially mystic character ; if their mentality as I have endeavoured to show, is oriented in another direc tion than our own ; we must admit, too, that their repre sentations are not connected with each other as ours would be. Must we then infer that these representations obey some other system of logic than the one which governs our own understanding ? That would be going too far, for such a hypothesis would exceed that which facts warrant us in affirming. Nothing proves that the connections of collective representations must depend solely upon laws of a logical kind. Moreover, the idea of a logic different from our own could only provide us with a negative concept, devoid of mean ing. Now as a matter of fact we can at least endeavour to comprehend how representations are connected in the minds of primitives. We understand their language, we make bargains with them, we succeed in interpreting their insti tutions and their belief : all this shows that there is a possible transition, a practicable method of communication between their mentality and our own.
